Beyond Technology: The Search for a Coherent European Mission-Critical
Communications Architecture

AeroMorning — John Smith — June 4, 2026

The announcement on 4 June 2026 that Airspan Networks, a U.S.-based
telecommunications company specializing in private 4G/5G networks and
Open RAN (Open Radio Access Network) infrastructure, has joined the ARES
(Asymmetric Response European System) consortium highlights a broader
strategic debate underway across Europe: how to build sovereign,
resilient, and interoperable communications capabilities for defense,
public safety, and critical infrastructure.

ARES is primarily driven by companies from Germany and the Netherlands,
notably Oramach and iVent Mobile, and seeks to combine terrestrial
networks, satellite communications, air-to-ground connectivity, and
secure digital services into a unified operational framework.

The announcement itself is important, but its broader significance lies
elsewhere. It raises a fundamental question facing Europe:

How can Europe create a coherent mission-critical communications
architecture while balancing sovereignty, industrial competition, budget
constraints, and multinational governance?

What Is ARES?

ARES (Asymmetric Response European System) is best understood as a
multi-domain communications and integration framework rather than a
standalone communications network.

Its objective is to integrate several technologies and operational
layers:

         * 4G/5G terrestrial communications;
         * Open RAN mobile infrastructure;
         * Air-to-ground communications;
         * Satellite connectivity;
         * Mission-critical communications services;
         * Secure digital platforms for operational users.

ARES targets:

         * military users;
         * border protection agencies;
         * emergency services;
         * civil protection organizations;
         * operators of critical national infrastructure.

The objective is to maintain resilient communications during:

         * military operations;
         * cyberattacks;
         * electronic warfare;
         * natural disasters;
         * large-scale emergencies.

ARES therefore belongs to a broader category of systems often described
as “system-of-systems architectures,” where multiple independent
infrastructures are interconnected into a common operational
environment.

Airspan’s Role: Important Contributor, Not System Architect

Airspan’s entry into ARES brings expertise in:

         * private wireless networks;
         * tactical communications;
         * Open RAN technologies;
         * deployable 4G/5G infrastructure.

The company has extensive experience supporting government, defense, and
critical infrastructure users.

However, Airspan should not be confused with a prime defense contractor
or a strategic systems architect.

Airspan is essentially a technology provider contributing specific
communications capabilities.

It does not occupy the same position as major defense primes such as
Airbus, Thales, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, or Northrop Grumman, which
are capable of integrating complete operational systems.

Its participation therefore strengthens ARES technologically, but it
does not fundamentally alter the balance of power within Europe’s
defense-industrial landscape.

ARES and IRIS²: Complementary Rather Than Identical

ARES is often compared with IRIS² (Infrastructure for Resilience,
Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite), the European Union’s
sovereign satellite communications initiative.

The two projects operate at different levels.

IRIS² aims to provide:

         * secure satellite communications;
         * sovereign space-based connectivity;
         * governmental and military communications services;
         * strategic European communications autonomy.

ARES, by contrast, is not a satellite constellation.

Its role is closer to integration and orchestration across multiple
communications domains.

In practical terms:

         * IRIS² can be viewed as part of the future European space
communications backbone;
         * ARES can be viewed as a framework capable of integrating space,
terrestrial, airborne, and potentially maritime communications assets.

The two approaches are therefore more complementary than competitive.

Eutelsat OneWeb: Europe’s Existing Strategic LEO Asset

Any discussion of European communications sovereignty must also consider
Eutelsat OneWeb.

Eutelsat OneWeb already operates a large Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite
constellation providing:

         * global broadband services;
         * governmental connectivity;
         * institutional communications services;
         * secure communications capabilities for defense users.

This gives Europe an existing strategic space asset long before IRIS²
reaches full operational maturity.

As a result, Europe’s communications landscape already includes:

         * IRIS²;
         * Eutelsat OneWeb;
         * national military communications systems;
         * terrestrial telecom infrastructures;
         * emerging integration initiatives such as ARES.

The challenge is increasingly becoming one of governance and
interoperability rather than pure technology development.

Europe’s Structural Constraint: Resources Are Finite

One reality often overlooked in discussions about European sovereignty
is funding.

European governments face multiple competing priorities:

         * defense modernization;
         * digital sovereignty;
         * space programs;
         * cybersecurity investments;
         * energy transition;
         * industrial competitiveness.

As a consequence:

         * not every program can become a flagship program;
         * not every architecture can be fully funded;
         * not every consortium can become the dominant European platform.

Political and budgetary choices will inevitably determine priorities.

This means that competition between programs, architectures, and
industrial alliances is unavoidable.

The Real Industrial Heavyweights

While ARES is attracting attention, Europe’s communications and
defense ecosystem remains dominated by a relatively small number of
major industrial actors.

These include:

         * Airbus;
         * Thales;
         * Leonardo;
         * Eutelsat;
         * SES;
         * Nokia;
         * Ericsson.

Among these actors, Airbus, Thales, and Leonardo occupy a particularly
important position because they function as prime contractors capable of
integrating complete defense and communications systems.

Their expertise covers:

         * satellite systems;
         * military communications;
         * secure government networks;
         * C4ISR architectures (C4ISR stands for Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance).

These architectures form the digital nervous system of modern military
operations.

Prime Contractors and Federators: Two Different Functions

A critical distinction is often overlooked in European debates.

A prime contractor and a federator are not the same thing.

A prime contractor:

         * designs and integrates systems;
         * manages suppliers;
         * delivers operational capability.

A federator operates at a higher level.

A federator:

         * defines architectural standards;
         * enforces interoperability;
         * coordinates multiple programs;
         * arbitrates between competing industrial interests;
         * ensures coherence across the entire ecosystem.

A federator is therefore not simply another industrial actor.

It is an authority operating above individual programs and prime
contractors.

The United States: Fragmented Industry, Centralized Governance

At first glance, the U.S. communications ecosystem appears fragmented.

It includes:

         * Starlink;
         * Starshield;
         * Lockheed Martin;
         * Northrop Grumman;
         * L3Harris;
         * General Dynamics;
         * numerous specialized technology providers.

However, this apparent fragmentation is coordinated through a powerful
institutional framework.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) effectively acts as a system-level
federator.

The DoD:

         * defines architectures;
         * establishes standards;
         * coordinates procurement;
         * enforces interoperability.

As a result, the United States combines industrial diversity with
architectural coherence.

The U.S. model is therefore not centralized industrially.

It is centralized at the governance level.

China: A Different Model

China follows a fundamentally different path.

Its approach is characterized by:

         * strong state coordination;
         * vertically integrated industrial structures;
         * civil-military fusion;
         * national control over strategic communications infrastructure.

This model prioritizes:

         * coherence;
         * scale;
         * rapid deployment;
         * alignment between industrial and national objectives.

Strengths and weaknesses of this model  are different from those of
federated systems.

Centralized architectures often maximize coherence and execution speed,
while potentially reducing architectural diversity and distributed
decision-making.

Russia: A State-Centric Strategic Communications Model

Russia also relies on a more centralized approach than most Western
systems.

Its communications architecture combines:

         * state-directed telecommunications infrastructure;
         * sovereign military networks;
         * government-led strategic communications capabilities;
         * national defense-industrial actors.

Although operating under different economic and technological conditions
than China, Russia similarly places greater emphasis on centralized
control than on federated governance.

Europe’s Emerging Model

Europe does not fit neatly into either the American or Chinese model.

Its reality is shaped by:

         * multiple sovereign states;
         * competing industrial champions;
         * national defense priorities;
         * European institutions;
         * mixed public-private ownership structures.

This naturally pushes Europe toward some form of federated architecture.

However, unlike the United States, Europe still lacks a clear federator
operating above individual programs and industrial champions.

Why a Federator Is Necessary

Without a federator, Europe risks:

         * overlapping programs;
         * competing standards;
         * duplicated investments;
         * reduced interoperability;
         * slower operational convergence.

A federator could:

         * define long-term architecture;
         * coordinate industrial efforts;
         * establish common standards;
         * arbitrate between competing priorities.

In short, a federator would help transform a collection of excellent
programs into a coherent system-of-systems.

Why a Federator Is Not Sufficient: The A400M Lesson

However, the existence of a federator alone does not guarantee success.

The Airbus A400M military transport aircraft provides an important
lesson.

The A400M program did not suffer from a lack of governance.

It benefited from:

         * multinational political support;
         * common governance structures;
         * a clearly identified industrial prime contractor;
         * shared strategic objectives.

Yet the program encountered significant challenges.

Several factors contributed:

Requirement Creep

Participating nations continuously added requirements.

The aircraft was expected to satisfy an exceptionally broad range of
missions and operational scenarios.

This increased complexity and cost.

Political Workshare Allocation

Industrial responsibilities were often influenced by political
considerations and national industrial-return objectives.

This approach supported political participation but did not always
maximize efficiency.

Excessive System Complexity

The combination of multiple national priorities created a platform that
became increasingly complex to develop and certify.

The result was an aircraft with impressive capabilities, but also
significant delays, technical difficulties, and budget overruns,  with
poor market attractivity due to cost to purchase and to operate.

Conclusion: Europe Needs More Than a Federator

The analysis of ARES, IRIS², Eutelsat OneWeb, the American, Chinese and
Russian models, as well as Europe’s industrial landscape, leads to a
more nuanced conclusion than the simple need for a federator.

Europe already possesses many of the technological and industrial
building blocks required to develop sovereign mission-critical
communications capabilities. Major prime contractors such as Thales,
Airbus and Leonardo, major satellite operators including Eutelsat
(France) and SES (Luxembourg), advanced telecommunications expertise,
and ambitious initiatives such as IRIS² provide Europe with a strong
foundation.

The challenge is therefore not primarily technological.

Nor is it simply the absence of a federating authority.

A successful European mission-critical communications architecture will
likely require four conditions to be met simultaneously:

1. A System-Level Federator

An authority capable of operating above individual programs and prime
contractors, defining common architectural objectives, enforcing
interoperability standards, and arbitrating competing priorities.

2. Strong Architectural Discipline

The ability to maintain strategic focus and prevent the uncontrolled
accumulation of requirements that can increase complexity, cost and
delivery risk.

3. Competence-Based Industrial Allocation

Responsibilities should be assigned primarily according to expertise,
technological maturity and industrial capability, while balancing
legitimate political and sovereignty considerations.

4. Modular and Interoperable Design

Rather than pursuing a monolithic system, Europe should favor a modular
architecture capable of integrating sovereign and commercial assets
across land, air, maritime, and space domains within a single
operational framework.

The experience of the A400M programme provides a valuable lesson in this
regard. Its difficulties did not primarily stem from a lack of
coordination or governance, but from the gradual accumulation of
requirements, industrial compromises, and sometimes conflicting
objectives. The programme demonstrates that a governance structure,
however robust, does not in itself guarantee the effectiveness of a
complex system.

The lesson is therefore not that multinational programmes are doomed to
fail. It is that success depends as much on the ability to define clear
priorities as it does on the ability to coordinate stakeholders.

For Europe, the challenge is not to eliminate trade-offs — inherent to
any major strategic programme — but to fully accept them. Any critical
communications architecture involves choices between sovereignty and
efficiency, harmonization and national flexibility, technological
ambition and economic sustainability.

The risk is not the absence of innovation. It lies in building a system
that is remarkably ambitious and technologically advanced, but whose
complexity, cost, and timelines ultimately reduce the expected
operational value — a lesson strongly reinforced by the history of the
A400M.

The central question is therefore less technological than institutional:
will Europe be able to establish a framework capable of setting
priorities, arbitrating between diverging interests, and preserving
overall coherence over the long term?