For a long time, the concept of “see and avoid” was the rule. It consists of spotting the other aircraft, moving away from it, then maintaining separation—often visually—and continuing on one’s route. But in the reality of this century’s airspace, which is most often saturated, this principle is becoming increasingly fragile. And we probably need the honesty to say so clearly. “See and avoid” is no longer enough when helicopters and airplanes operate in dense environments. Faced with this, the FAA is opening its eyes.

The decision was announced recently. The FAA said it would suspend the use of visual separation between helicopters and airplanes in certain areas around major American airports. In explaining the move, the U.S. authority said there had been too much reliance on this see-and-avoid rule in airspace where crew workload is often heavy. From now on, in these areas, controllers will have to ensure lateral or vertical radar separation. The measure follows, in particular, the January 2025 collision near Reagan National that killed 67 people, as well as other near-collisions recently reported in San Antonio and Burbank.

The most important thing is not just the new rule. The most important thing is what it says about the old one. If the FAA now considers it necessary to move away from a purely visual logic at more than 150 major airports, it is clearly because the method was showing its limits in traffic. As recently as March 24, 2026, a similar incident made headlines in the American media. United Airlines Flight 589 was on approach to John Wayne Airport in Santa Ana, California, when a Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopter crossed its flight path. Once again, the FAA opened a near-collision investigation.

We should also be wary of the phrase itself. “See and avoid” sounds good. It is reassuring. It evokes an almost handcrafted, flying-club kind of aviation, where the pilot retains total control over the surrounding environment. But when a helicopter is following an axis, or an aircraft is on final approach with hundreds of passengers, at often very different speeds and at similar altitudes, the situation is no longer the same. One only has to tune in to certain aeronautical frequencies near major hubs. Radio communications are often busy. This environment is not conducive to the simplicity of “see and avoid,” where human perception can sometimes reach its limits.

The American investigation into the Potomac collision highlighted this weakness precisely. The NTSB—the U.S. investigative body—concluded not only that there had been FAA oversight failures, but also that visual separation had been overused as though it were an infallible tool. The report explicitly points to the helicopter crew’s failure to maintain visual separation. But investigators also determined that human vision is not a 100% guarantee. Even when attentive, it can be imperfect.

That, fundamentally, is where the real debate lies. “See and avoid” is not heresy. It remains useful, often indispensable, but it becomes dangerous when it starts being treated as a single, robust solution.

It is even surprising that this did not change much earlier. Modern aviation is a world of safety layers, faithful to Reason’s model (=“Errors are the result of a chain of failures, not just an individual”). Yet the visual layer is one of the most vulnerable. Anyone who has flown a bit under VFR knows this. It depends on weather, lighting, blind spots, stress, available attention, radio workload, and more. In 2026, one may well wonder how the safety of certain saturated airspaces was built for years on something as fragile as the pilot’s naked vision.

This American shift also deserves to be studied well beyond the United States. Because this is not only an American issue. Wherever different types of traffic intersect, the question arises. How much longer can we ask the human eye to compensate for the growing complexity of airspace? The answer should be: less than before. In the United States, the latest version of the ALERT Act (Airspace Location and Enhanced Risk Transparency Act) also requires that most aircraft be equipped with ADS-B In by the end of 2031. This system can be displayed on a portable device, a tablet, or a cockpit screen. As a reminder, the system determines its position by GPS and transmits that position to ground stations and to other ADS-B-equipped aircraft operating in the area. Still, every user has to play along. Yet daily operations show that state aircraft are often the worst offenders, failing to activate these systems under the cover of confidentiality.

“See and avoid” has not disappeared. But we must stop asking it to guarantee what it no longer can. And the issue is not limited to aircraft; it also extends to the dozens of service vehicles operating on the taxiways of international airports. These vehicles are a threat to the aviation ecosystem as a whole when radio calls are masked on congested frequencies. In a denser, faster, and more constrained sky, seeing is not always enough. And waiting for the next collision to admit it would, this time, be inexcusable.

Jean-François Bourgain, March 25, 2026, for AeroMorning