Europe Confronts Its Lag in Counter-Drone Defense

Drones are no longer an anecdotal phenomenon, as their development continues to grow. Since the start of the new school year, they have also become a concern for the security of European airspace. Indeed, these devices regularly breach national airspaces, triggering alerts, interceptions, and sometimes even airport shutdowns. These repeated incidents are a wake-up call. Despite announcements and the acceleration of certain programs, Europe’s systems to counter these new threats remain clearly vulnerable. Europe is now realizing the extent of its delay in this area.

Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Denmark, Norway, and even France—several countries have recently reported drone incursions in critical zones such as international airports. These events prove that European authorities are capable of detecting, alerting, and responding. However, they also highlight more problematic areas such as decision-making delays, rules of engagement, and cross-border coordination. In these respects, mere encouragement will not suffice for Europe. In Poland, one particular incident in September stood out: of the 19 drones that flew through its airspace without authorization, only three were intercepted—a ratio that, beyond the symbolism, raises serious questions.

Since the early 1990s, many European countries have focused their defense efforts on so-called “high-spectrum” threats, such as fighter jets, missiles, and long-range surface-to-air defenses. In contrast, close-range defense—meant to protect bases, depots, critical infrastructure, or airports—has often been reduced or even neglected. Yet drones specifically exploit this weakness with their ability to fly low and slow. Added to this structural vulnerability is a cost problem. Shahed/Geran-type drones (cost: €25,000) remain relatively inexpensive compared to the resources typically deployed to counter them. The same goes for intercepting commercially available drones that cost only a few hundred euros. Intercepting a drone worth a few thousand euros with an air-to-air missile like the Sidewinder (cost: €130,000), fired from an F-35, represents a disproportionate financial effort—not to mention the flight’s hourly cost (€40,000), aircraft wear and tear, and so on.

Aware of the threat posed by both civilian and military drones, several states are now accelerating their response. Poland is working on a multi-layered defense system combining sensors, interceptors (missiles, guns), drones, and infrastructure hardening. Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark are turning to the Skyranger: an automatic cannon (typically 30 mm or 35 mm), radars and optronic sensors (detection, tracking, identification), a very fast fire-control system, and a mobile platform. France, for its part, is developing the Proteus system: radar sensors, optronic sensors (day/night cameras, infrared), data fusion, an open and scalable architecture, and possible integration with effectors (jamming, cannons, missiles, lasers, etc.) and exploring the potential of laser weapons. But the issue is not just technological—it is also organizational. An effective anti-drone defense, whether against civilian or military threats, depends on proper integration of various systems. This means shared detection, a responsive command chain, a clear doctrine (who decides, when, and with what), and the ability to rapidly deploy protective bubbles around sensitive sites.

Ukraine, for example—faced daily with military drones—has developed pragmatic solutions and uses simple, cost-effective systems such as machine guns, signal jammers, interceptor drones, improvised industrial tools, or upgraded recycled systems. These approaches have one thing in common: they aim to multiply available tools to maintain a long-lasting protective bubble and adapt the response to the threat level. Clearly, none of these methods guarantees perfect neutralization rates, but they pave the way for a more flexible and economically sustainable defense.

The “Drone Wall”: A Growing Concept to Counter Military Drones

The idea of a “drone wall” regularly resurfaces in the fight against drones, especially military ones. The concept involves creating a joint defensive line combining radar, jamming systems, and interceptors along a border or between multiple countries. The Baltic States have been calling for it since 2023, and the idea is starting to gain traction elsewhere. Beyond the metaphor, the goal is to pool alerts, densify coverage, and prevent an incursion into one country from becoming a collective issue due to a lack of coordination.

Drones, both civilian and military, have become increasingly accessible, customizable, and usable by a wide range of actors in recent years. For Europe, the challenge is therefore twofold. It must learn to protect critical sites such as airports, and it must also learn to incorporate drones into its own operational methods, as the technology is here to stay.

Jean-François Bourgain, January 2, 2026, for AeroMorning